Abstract: Establishment Clause doctrine has long been informed by two mutually antagonistic values: the separation of church and state, and government neutrality with respect to religion. This puzzle of conflicting values mirrors that of Speech Clause doctrine, which has operated for decades with a value conflict between content-based and content-neutral regulation under the so-called "two-track" theory of the Speech Clause. This Article compares Establishment Clause doctrine with the two-track Speech Clause in order to illuminate how separation and neutrality might coexist. Just as Speech Clause doctrine provides an absolute minimum of constitutional protection for expression against even content-neutral regulation, so also Establishment Clause doctrine provides for an absolute minimum of church-state separation against even religiously neutral government action. As a result, neutrality has not totally eclipsed separation, which is the more fundamental Establishment Clause value.
also stated that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa." Separation seeks to ensure that government and religion each operate freely in their own separate spheres, uninhibited by regulation or control by the other. 4 Neutrality requires that government regulate its interactions with religious individuals and institutions so that it neither encourages nor discourages religious beliefs or practices. In Epperson v. Arkansas, for example, the Court stated that
[g] overnment in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.5
Neutrality seeks to ensure that the degree of acceptance enjoyed by any particular religion is the result of the free and independent choices of its members, undistorted by government coercion or influence.6
Neutrality and separation are in considerable tension.? Separation requires that the government sometimes treat religion worse, and sometimes better, than comparable secular activities. An Establishment Clause doctrine informed by separation presupposes that the involvement of government in matters of religious belief and practice threatens liberty in ways that government involvement in secular matters does not.8 Separationist doctrine thus subjects relationships between religion and government to special scrutiny, which may result in religion's being subjected to legal and regulatory burdens not imposed on secular activities, or relieved from burdens that are generally imposed on such activities. 9 The School Prayer Cases, for example, teach that government may not involve itself in the composition or encouragement of religious worship in public schools, even if stu- ( 1997) (arguing that religious liberty is maximized by minimizing "the government's influence over personal choices concerning religious beliefs and practices," and that this goal is "realized when government is neutral as to the religious choices of its citizens"); Esbeck, supra note 4, at 316-17 (arguing that the "common baseline" for measuring "the government's influence over personal choices concerning religious beliefs and practices" is that which "minimize[s] the impact of governmental action on individual religious choices").
As I and others have argued, the position that religious belief and practice are unique and especially valuable activities thereby entitled to unique and special protection from burdensome government action is no longer tenable. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 1245 (1994); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. Urn!, ROCK L. Rev. 555 (1998). For there to be a genuine absence of government influence on individual religious choices, goverinne ►t cannot advantage religion relative to comparable secular beliefs and practices. Because most secular beliefs and practices-even most secular beliefs and practices that are morally comparable to religious belief and practice-have no special claim to insulation from government influence or coercion, allowing such insulation only to religious beliefs and practices is a clear departure from neutrality. Laycock eliminates the tension between separation and neutrality only by begging the question whether religious belief and activity merit special constitutional protection.
See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Tb Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Relit ion Clauses, '7 J. Commr. LEGAL ISSUES 357 (1996) . 9 See, e.g., Laura S. Underkufiler, Public Funding for Religious Schools: Difficufties and Dangers in a Pluralistic Society, 27 OXFORD Rev. Enuc. 577, 583 (2001). [Vol. 43:1071 analyses of content-based and content-neutral regulation continue to organize Speech Clause doctrine.
I propose to compare Establishment Clause doctrine and the twotrack Speech Clause in the hope of illuminating how neutrality and separation might coexist under the Establishment Clause. I will argue that, just as Speech Clause doctrine provides an absolute minimum of protection for freedom of expression against even content-neutral regulation, so also Establishment Clause doctrine provides a minimum level of church-state separation against even religiously neutral government actions. In other words, not only has the separation of church and state not been eclipsed by religious neutrality, but separation is actually the more fundamental Establishment Clause value. As such, separation remains a necessary check on interactions between religion and government that pass muster under neutrality analysis.
I will begin with a description of how the two-track theory developed and functions under the Speech Clause, 17 and will follow that with a discussion of how an analogous theory might function under the Establishment Clause. 18 I will close with some observations on what the two-track theory might mean for areas of Establishment Clause doctrine involving education vouchers, faith-based delivery of social services, and public school prayer. 18
I. THE TWO-TRACK THEORY OF THE SPEECH CLAUSE

A. Doctrinal Development: Content-Based and Content-Neutral Analyses
The two-track theory has its origin in a dictum voiced by the majority in Cantwell v. Connecticut, in which the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for common-law breach of the peace for having played an offensive phonograph recording for passersby on a public sidewalk. Although the Court reversed the conviction, it nevertheless observed that "epithets or personal abuse" do not constitute "communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution," so that criminal punishment of such expressions would raise no Speech Clause issues."
Two years later, the Court cited the Cantwell dictum in holding that "insulting or 'fighting' words"-that is, words that "by their very 17 See infra notes 20-56 and accompanying text. 18 See infra notes 57-106 and accompanying text. 19 See infra notes 107-131 and accompanying text. utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"-are not protected by the Speech Clause. 21 The Court justified its holding with the twin observations that "the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances," and that there are "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."22 The Court went on to suggest that, along with fighting words, defamatory, profane, and obscene speech are also unprotected by the Speech Clause. 23 Shortly thereafter, the Court added commercial speech to the list of constitutionally unprotected utterances," and subsequently confirmed that defamatory and obscene speech are indeed outside the bounds of Speech Clause protection."
As originally conceived and applied, the two-track theory relieved the government of the need to prove that unprotected speech posed a "clear and present danger" to legitimate governmental or social interests." Once the government demonstrated that expression fell into an unprotected category, it could justify punishment of such expression merely by showing that it bore a conceivable relationship to a legitimate objective-a showing that is easily made. 27 As time went on, however, the Court narrowed the definitional boundaries of unprotected speech," at the same time that it began to give some constitu-21 ChapliDS1Cy v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572-74 (1942) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309-10)). 22 Id at 571-72. 70 (1966) (arguing that the two-track theory was developed precisely to avoid application of the clear-and-present-danger test to speech that was traditionally punishable at common law).
27 See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (upholding rationality of traffic safety regulation prohibiting advertising on delivery trucks unless related to the business using the trucks, because local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they use").
23 E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining a work as obscene only if:
(1) "the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest"; (2) the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law"; and (3) "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding public profanity not punishable absent strong and detailed proof that it would provoke a violent audience reaction or seriously [Vol. 43:1071 tional protection to categories of speech that had previously been thought to lie entirely outside the ambit of the Speech Clause." This trend has persisted to the point that regulation of speech based upon its "unprotected" character has virtually disappeared." Although the two-track theory remains, contemporary doctrine associates contentbased regulation with "low-value" rather than "unprotected" speech. 31 undermine public morality); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding advocacy of criminal behavior punishable only when the speaker expressly advocates commission of a criminal act under circumstances which make the act highly likely to occur in the immediate future). REv. 1333 REv. , 1344 REv. (1991 .
[My abandoning the strict "two-level" theory of "protected" and "unprotected" expression, Brennan's opinion in New York Times ushered in a new era of first amendment doctrine in which the Court, freed from the rigid constraints of the past, has been able to adopt a more flexible mode of analysis to deal with a broad range of "low value" expression.
.Id. The insertion of low-value speech into Speech Clause doctrine, however, has blurred the distinction between content-based and content-neutral analysis. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-51 (1986) (arguing that zoning regulation of the secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses does not constitution content-based regulation). Compare City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1728 , 1741 (Kennedy, j., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the purported content-neutrality of Renton-style zoning ordinances is a fiction, and concluding that a zoning ordinance that applies only to sexually oriented businesses is necessarily content-based), with id. at 1745-46 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, B., dissenting) (arguing that regulation of the secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses "occupies a kind of limbo between fullblown, content-based restrictions and regulations that apply without any reference to the substance of what is said," and that such regulation should be called "content correlated" to remind judges of the increasing constitutional risk of censorship "when a law applies selectively only to speech of particular content").
As before, speech is presumed to be high-value unless it is shown to fit within one of the low-value categories. 32
The two tracks of Speech Clause doctrine, then, are contentbased and content-neutral analysis. Content-based regulation of expression is suspect when applied to so-called "high-value" speech like criticism of the government, but is generally permitted (although subject to limitations) in case of low-value speech like private libel, commercial speech, profanity, and pornography. High-value speech, on the other hand, may be regulated only by content-neutral laws that restrict only the time, place, or manner of such speech.
B. The "Central Meaning" of the Speech Clause: Preservation of Self-Government
The two-track theory stems from the widespread intuition that not all expression is of the same value. It is based on a "tolerance" model of the Speech Clause, which presupposes the ability reliably to distinguish valuable speech from deviant expression, presumptively permitting only speech that "serves a positive social function." 33 If one grants the premise that some speech has more social value than other speech, something like the two-track theory is inevitable. Without it, the heavy burden of justification generally imposed on government regulation of speech would have to be diluted in order to permit the regulation of speech of dubious value, like child pornography; otherwise, the same heavy burden of justification generally imposed on government regulation of high-value speech would have to be im-32 See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15 (concluding that profane expression of a political view was entitled to full Speech Clause protection because it did not constitute obscenity, fighting words, or speech that provoked a hostile audience reaction).
33 Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1565 (1988). Gey is, of course, relying on the classic definition of governmental "tolerance" under which the government presupposes the existence of a "correct" view of a matter, but nevertheless permits a certain degree of dissent. See, e.g., 18 Tint OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 199, 200 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "tolerate" as "to put up with" and "toleration" as "the disposition to be patient with or indulgent to the opinions or practices of others"). An exemplar of such "toleration" was the seventeenth century English Act of Toleration, which reaffirmed the Anglican establishment as the official state church of England, but permitted non-Anglican Protestants a right to practice their religion subject to considerable civil disabilities. See Tricorns J. CURRY, FAREWELL TO CHRIS-TENDOM; THE FUTURE OF CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 24-25 (2001) . This classic definition is not to be confused with the more widely used contemporary understanding of "tolerance" as openness to, or acceptance of, opposing views. [Vol. 43:1071 posed on regulation of low-value speech.34 Across-the-board dilution of the burden of justification would seriously undermine constitutional protection of high-value speech, whereas across-the-board application of a heavy burden of justification would place speech that probably should be regulated beyond government contro1. 35 The twotrack theory permits substantial regulation of low-value speech without directly threatening protection of high-value speech.
Bastan College Law Review
The two-track theory of the Speech Clause thus depends on a routing mechanism that determines whether the Court will apply con-.tent-based or content-neutral analysis by distinguishing high-value from low-value speech. This routing function is performed by the relation of the speech to self-government. A multitude of commentators throughout the twentieth century have argued that the predominant purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses is to secure popular control over political decision making and the operation of government generally by prohibiting punishment of speech that criticizes government or otherwise discusses matters of public import. was nothing more than absence of the censorship, as Blackstone said. All through the eighteenth century, however, there existed beside this definite legal meaning of liberty of the press, a definite popular meaning: the right of unrestricted discussion of public affairs. There can be no doubt that this was in a general way what freedom of speech meant to the framers of the Constitution."); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVI-LEGE" 18-19 (2000) (The "popular tradition" of freedom of speech from the time of the founding into the twentieth century "especially emphasized free speech in relation to democracy, as well as free speech as an inherent human right."); JohN HART ELY, DENtoc.-RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REviEw 93-94, 112 (1980) To identify the protection of speech relating to political and public matters as the central purpose of the Speech Clause is not to deny the importance of other kinds of expression protected by the Speech Clause, particularly expression relating to self-fulfillment or the search for truth." As Justice Brandeis famously argued, the framers of the First Amendment believed that the ultimate purpose of government was to protect the freedom of citizens to live their lives as they saw fit, thus making the freedom of speech not only a means of creatin Madison's phrase, 'the censorial power' would be in the Government over the people and not 'in the people over the Government.'") (quoting N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 275). 37 376 U.S. at 273-75 (declaring that the controversy surrounding the Sedition Act of 1'798 "crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment," which is that the "right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials" is a "fundamental principle of the American form of government"). 539, 559 (1985) ); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976) ("The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but the people individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and political committees who must retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues . .."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("[S] peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.") ; see also Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (The contemporary purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses is "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.") ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101-02 (1940) .
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the public need for information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times.... Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.
Id.
59 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) The constitutional right of flee expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
Id, 41 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and cow-age to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth .... Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form. 414, 421-22 (1988) ("Core political speech" consists of "both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change."); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 203 (1996) (arguing for constitutive over instrumental justifications for the freedom of speech on the ground that the former do not protect "the First Amendment's political core");
Id.; see also
McCLosttzv, supra note 34, at 155 (observing that modern Supreme Court decisions perwit the regulation of "core 'political speech' only in extreme circumstances"); RAWLS,
The two-track theory thus rests on the proposition that the preeminent purpose of the Speech Clause, though obviously not the only one, is to ensure popular control of government by protecting the free flow of information necessary for citizens to assess whether the government is doing what they wish, and to criticize it vigorously and publicly when it is not.° As measured by this purpose, some speech is simply not as important as other speech.44 Which doctrinal track one uses in a Speech Clause case-content-based or content-neutral analysis-depends on the proximity of the speech to this central purpose. Professor Sunstein, for example, lists three of the four characteristics that seem to characterize low-value speech as (1) a tenuous relation to "governmental process" and "popular control of public affairs," (2) a noncognitive message that does not expressly "transmit ideology or ideas," and (3) a likelihood that regulation or prohibition of the speech is not motivated by government self-interest.° The further that speech strays from the Speech Clause's core purpose of assisting popular control of government by ensuring the free flow of information about political and public affairs, the more likely it is that such speech will be accorded low-value status.
supra note 36, at 348 (arguing that the "central range" of the freedom of speech consists of the "free public use of our reason in all matters that concern the justice of the basic structure [of government] and its social policies").
43 Stms'rEtN, supra note 34, at 238 ("Restrictions on political speech have the distinctive feature of impairing the ordinary channels for political change."); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 622-23 ("The guarantee of free speech is designed largely to combat the evils of factional tyranny and self-interested representation, and to ensure that government outcomes are the product of some form of deliberation on the part of the citizenry. If portions of the citizenry are powerless and for that reason unable to participate in deliberative processes, free speech will not serve its goals.").
" See, e.g., SuNsmIN, supra note 34, at 233 ( -The absence of [Speech Clause] protection for conspiracies, purely verbal workplace harassment of individuals on the basis of race and sex, unlicensed medical and legal advice, bribery, and threats appears to owe something to a distinction between political and nonpolitical use of speech."); David M.
Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 1205, 1352 (1983) ("[T] here are compelling reasons rooted in first amendment theory for affording more constitutional protection to 'public ideological solicitation' than to 'private nonideological solicitation.' Advocating robbery or murder for private gain surely stands on a different constitutional footing than advocating principled resistance to politically unpopular government policies.").
43 Sunstein, supra note 43, at 603-04. Sunstein identifies the fourth characteristic as a low probability that regulation has been undertaken for "constitutionally impermissible reasons" or to produce "constitutionally troublesome harms." Id. at 604. Sunstein has elsewhere emphasized, however, that " [t] he Court has yet to offer a clear principle to unify the categories of speech that it treats as 'low value.'" SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 233. [Vol. 43:1071 To summarize, a speech regulation is routed between the content-based and the content-neutral analytic tracks on the basis of the proximity of the speech it regulates to democratic self-government. The more political the speech, the more closely it relates to matters of public policy and interest, and the more it communicates a cognitive ideological message, the more likely that the speech will be considered high-value and the less likely that content-based regulation of it will be upheld.
C. The Absolute Value of the Freedom of Speech
Content-based regulation of high-value speech is suspect under the Speech Clause, and is upheld only if narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.` Content-neutral regulation of such speech, by contrast, is generally upheld. Even so, content neutrality is not a sufficient condition for upholding a regulation of speech under the Speech Clause. Content-neutral regulations must also be "narrowly tailored" to a "significant" or "substantial" regulatory interest and must leave open "adequate alternative avenues of communication." 47
The narrow-tailoring and substantial-interest requirements have proved to be less significant protections of freedom of expression than one might assume from their rhetorical similarity to the classic formulation of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Narrow tailoring does not demand that government use the least restrictive or intrusive means of regulating , speech, but requires only a showing that the government's regulatory interest "would be achieved less effectively" in the absence of regulation, and that the regulation does not burden "substantially more speech" than is necessary to protect the government's interest.° Because it does not require any balancing at the margin, narrow tailoring results in invalidation of contentneutral speech regulations only when the fit between the government's interest in regulation and the speech actually regulated is ex- 640, 647-51 (1981) .
48 Ward, 491 U.S. at 797-800; see, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297 (1984) (holding that because the government had a legitimate interest in protecting the environment of national parks, and that environment might be harmed by allowing protestors to sleep at national park sites not open for camping, "the ban is safe from invalidation under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of the manner in which a demonstration may be carried out"). ceptionally loose." Similarly, relatively lightweight regulatory interests, such as preservation of aesthetic appearance, have been held to satisfy the substantiality standard." _ In contrast to narrow tailoring and substantiality, the adequate communicative alternatives prong of the content-neutrality test has a more consistent bite. The Court will often strike down a contentneutral law if it prevents a speaker's communication of the message.'" For example, the Court applies heightened scrutiny to contentneutral regulations that eliminate or substantially restrict an entire mode of communication." Even when a law leaves numerous alternative means of communicating the speaker's message, it may nevertheless be struck down if it leaves a particular speaker with no alternative (2002) (striking down door-to-door solicitation permit designed to prevent fraud and crime and to protect residential privacy, because permit interfered with "a significant number of noncommercial 'canvassers' promoting a wide variety of 'causes,'" including religious and political ones, and virtually eliminated anonymous and spontaneous solicitadon). The Court has sometimes understood a less restrictive means requirement to demand at 812 n.30 (The Court has shown ''special solicitude for forms of expression that are much less expensive than feasible alternatives and hence may be important to a large segment of the citizenry."). But see Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 549-50 (upholding ban on graffiti even though graffiti is an "inexpensive means of communicating political, commercial, and frivolous messages to large numbers of people" and "some creators of graffiti have no effective alternative means of publicly expressing themselves"). Professor Kalven described heightened scrutiny of contentneutral regulation of important or traditional means of communication as an appropriate placement of "the thumb of the Court . . . on the speech side of the scales" in the constitutional balance of government regulation against freedom of expression. 56 Once speech is classified as high-value, it should be accorded a presumption of importance that need not attach to low-value speech. Accordingly, even speech regulations that are content-neutral must leave open realistic alternative avenues for expression.
In short, the predominance of democratic self-government over other justifications for speech is reflected in the communicative alternatives prong of content-neutral analysis, which embodies special concern to ensure the free flow of information even when regulation of high-value speech is content-neutral and justified by a substantial government interest.
II. A TWO-TRACK THEORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Doctrinal Development: Separation and Neutrality Analyses
Although in Everson u Board of Education the Supreme Court had emphasized the importance of both neutrality and separation,57 it was separation that dominated the first three decades of Establishment Clause decisions 58 Invoking neutrality rhetoric largely as a matter of form during this era," the Court struck down most government action that helped or encouraged religious belief and practice, such as public school prayer and government aid to religiously sponsored elementary and secondary schools.°5 particular content-neutral restrictions diminish the opportunities for free expression, the Court should err on the side of free speech. It should allocate the risk of uncertainty to the government, not to speakers."). The inequity entailed in preventing religious individuals and groups from receiving benefits and funds that are freely available to secular individuals and groups made the development and application of neutrality analysis inevitable. The Court began to incorporate neutrality reasoning into its decisions during the 1980s and 1990s, repeatedly holding, for example, that the Establishment Clause does not justify the use of a student's religious viewpoint as a basis for excluding the student from accessing public education facilities or funds that the student would otherwise be eligible to use for expressive purposes.° This reasoning was soon extended to government benefits generally, with the concomitant narrowing or overruling of prior separationist decisions that had prohibited receipt of such benefits by religious individuals and institutions." Indeed, for a time it seemed that neutrality analysis would wholly displace separation analysis under the Establishment Clause.67
But complete displacement never occurred. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)) (striking down practice of student invocations prior to high school football games because, inter alia, the school had "failed to divorce itself from the religious content in the invocations," with the result that the prayers bore "the imprint of the State" and were correctly perceived as having been invited and encouraged by the school).
[Vol. 43:1071 aspects of the doctrine remain informed largely by separation.° Neu trality analysis now appears to control cases involving government distribution of financial and tangible benefits and services to religious persons and organizations, whereas separation analysis continues to determine cases involving religious worship and speech by government, internal disputes among the members of religious organizations, and the delegation of government power to religious persons or organizations."
The two tracks of Establishment Clause doctrine, then, are separation and neutrality analysis. Separation analysis prohibits most government aid to, and interactions with, religion, even when these are undertaken on the same basis as aid to comparably situated secular individuals and organizations. Neutrality analysis, by contrast, permits government aid to and interaction with religious individuals and organizations, so long as this is done on the same basis as aid to comparably situated secular individuals and organizations. Father Curry has persuasively argued that the phrase "establishment of religion" in the Establishment Clause was understood by Americans of the founding era to refer to a church which the government funded and controlled and in which it used its coercive power to encourage participation, like the Anglican church in England, or the Roman Catholic church in southern Europe." A church "established" in this manner was understood to have three signal characteristics. First, as the guardian of the official government religion, the established church properly exercised the coercive power of government, including the power to enforce as criminal infractions of the church's denominational rules and moral requirements," as well as the power to reserve governmental offices and other privileges exclusively for its congregants. 74 Second, the established church was enstate may not declare articles of faith. The state may not express an opinion about religious matters. It may not encourage citizens to hold certabt religious beliefs."); cf. Gey, supra note 33, at 1566 (arguing that under a skepticism model of the Speech Clause, it is pre-, sumed that no theory of moral certainty exists that would permit a determination that deviant speech is sufficiently antisocial that it may properly be suppressed [Vol. 43:1071 titled to a share of general tax revenues and other government financial assistance in direct support of its worship, rituals, and other denominational activities, often in the form of mandatory tithes collected from members and nonmembers alike. 75 Third, significant aspects of the established church were subject to government control or approval, such as the definition of doctrine and the selection of leaders.76
Many of the repressive attributes of the Anglican establishment in England were replicated in the colonies." Under the Anglican estab- 75 E.g., Franklin, supra note 74, at 58-59 (observing that in England, dissenting churches are not entitled to any of the mandatory tithes collected from their congregains) ; see WITrE, supra note 63, at 30, 32 (noting that one of the colonists' grievances against England was their subjection to the religious taxes and assessments of the Church of England).
76 MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 74, at 21 (summarizing royal control over the Church of England, including royal power to correct doctrinal errors, to prescribe liturgical requirements and ministerial qualifications, and to appoint the Archbishop of Canterbury and other high church officials); wrrn, supra note 63, at 190 rile [English] common law prescribed orthodox doctrine, liturgy, and morality ... [and] governed the form and function of the established church polity. It delineated the boundaries of the parishes and the location of the churches. It determined the procedures of the vestries and the prerogatives of the consistories. It defined the duties of the clerics and the amount of their compensation. It dictated the form of the church corporation and the disposition of its endowments.") .
77 See, e.g., Carolina Fundamental Constitutions of 1669 1 96, reprinted in 5 THE Fowr-DERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 74, at 51 (providing that colonial parliament shall establish parishes and provide for public maintenance of churches and ministers "according to the Church of England; which being the only true and orthodox, and the national religion of all the King's dominions, is so also of Carolina; and, therefore, it alone shall be allowed to receive public maintenance, by grant of parliament"); The Body of Liberties of the Massachusets Collonie in New England § 58 (1641), reprinted in 5 THE FotnktnEas' CONSTITU-TION, supra note 74, at 47-48 (providing that the rites, ordinance, "peace," and "Rules of Christ" observed in the Congregational churches shall be enforceable by civil authorities); see also Underkuffier, supra note 9, at 578.
In the 17th and 18th centuries, religious oppression and persecution characterised virtually all of the American colonies. Quakers, Baptists, Roman lishment in Virginia, for example-the "most rigid and exclusive establishment of religion in America"-the Church of England enjoyed the benefit of land grants, financial support by a mandatory tithe, enforcement of compulsory Anglican worship, and the harassment and prohibition of religious competitors. 78 Baptist, Congregationalist, and Roman Catholic clergy were routinely fined and imprisoned, and were subject to summary expulsion from the colony. 79 Quakers were frequently subjected to imprisonment and expulsion, and Roman Catholics were prohibited from holding public office. 80 Between 1720 and 1750, more Virginians were indicted for failing to attend Anglican services than for any other crime, with evasion of mandatory tithes a close second. 81
It is widely accepted that the Establishment Clause (as well as the Religious Test Clause before it) was included in the Constitution primarily to prevent the federal government from establishing a national church, and secondarily to insulate then-existing state-established churches from federal interference.82 State establishments disapCatholics, Jews, and Unitarians were particular targets for persecution. Criminal penalties, civil disabilities, and other sanctions were imposed if individuals persisted in the exercise of forbidden faiths, refused to affirm the tenets of the dominant faith, or otherwise offended majority religious sensibilities. Citizens were also taxed for their support of established Christian churches, a practice which engendered particularly bitter opposition. 1680-1810, at 141-42 (1981) .
Id. For a succinct description of the general characteristics
On the original purposes of the Establishment Clause, see DAVID P. U.S. at 668) ('The three main evils" of establishment are "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.") , Wrrrs, supra note 63, at 183
(reading the three elements of separationism as preventing Irleligious officials" from "converting the offices of government into instruments of their mission and ministry," "[g]overnment" from "funding, sponsoring, or actively involving itself in the religious exercises of a particular religious group or religious official," and "[r]eligious groups" from "drawing on government sponsorship or funding for their core religious exercises"); Underkuffler, supra note 9, at 580-81 (describing the "three forms of establishment of religion by government that are particularly problematic from a constitutional point of view" as "state favouritism toward particular religious (or nonreligious) groups; the granting of state financial support to religious institutions; and the assumption by religious institutions of essentially public functions"). those that do not raise separationist concerns-such as government benefits which religious individuals qualify to receive under secular criteria, or government aid to or funding of secular services performed by religious groups, is properly determined by neutrality analysis.
In other words, a government interaction with religion is routed onto one Establishment Clause track or the other on the basis of its similarity to the attributes of the eighteenth century governmentestablished church. The more that a government interaction with religion displays these attributes, the more likely it is that it will be evaluated by separation rather than neutrality analysis.
C. The Absolute Value of the Separation of Church and State
Just as mere content-neutrality is not a sufficient condition for upholding a restriction on expression under the Speech Clause, so also mere neutrality among religious denominations, or between religion and nonreligion, is not sufficient by itself to sustain a government action under the Establishment Clause. For example, for many years the Court analyzed the constitutionality of direct government aid to religious organizations in terms of whether the aid was susceptible to diversion from the secular use for which it was provided to a sectarian use.89 Aid that was capable of being diverted to sectarian uses was deemed to violate the Establishment Clause, even in the absence of evidence that the aid was actually so diverted. Under this analysis, a private religious school's receipt of, say, a computer from the government under secular disbursement criteria would have normally been held to violate the Establishment Clause because the computer could easily be used by the priest or minister of the congregation sponsoring the religious school to track attendance at worship services, to write sermons delivered at those services, to list potential persons or areas to target for proselytizing, or for other sectarian religious purposes. This was true even if it was clear that the computer had not, in fact, been diverted to any such use.
The (2000) (providing that federal funds supplied directly to faith-based welfare service providers pursuant to government contract may not be used for "sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization"). [Vol. 43:1071 jority of the Court still clings to actual diversion as a constitutional test. In Mitchell v. Helms, four Justices maintained that both potential and actual diversion of government aid to sectarian uses are irrelevant to the constitutionality of an aid program under the Establishment Clause, arguing that when aid does not have an impermissibly religious content its distribution according to religiously neutral criteria does not violate the Establishment Clause, even if the aid is subsequently diverted to sectarian uses 9D Two Justices agreed with the plurality on the irrelevance of potential diversion, but flatly rejected the plurality's abandonment of actual diversion and its adoption of neutrality as the sole test, labeling it a rule of "unprecedented breadth." 91 The three dissenters argued for retention of potential diversion as the appropriate test, which necessarily encompasses actual diversion. 92
Although one can argue that even prohibitions on actual diversion of direct aid to worship, denominational instruction, and other denominational activities have no real economic effect, 93 such prohibitions serve a useful symbolic purpose. Direct assistance of such activities implies government endorsement of a particular religion and the use of government power, prestige, and largesse to assist that relig-9° 530 U.S. at 820 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., & Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.).
91 Id. at 837-38 (O'Connor, J., joined Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); accord Underktvfiler, supra note 9, at 583 ("the idea that government aid-no matter how massive-can be given to religious institutions, as long as it is done on a 'neutral' basis, is a radical departure from previously existing Establishment Clause doctrine."); see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 239-35 (discarding the presumption that public employees will inevitably teach religion when performing their secular functions on religious school campuses, in favor of a standard that inquires whether actual religious teaching by public employees has taken place).
92 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 884 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter & Ginsberg, 11., dissenting) ('The insufficiency of evenhandedness neutrality as a stand-alone criterion of constitutional intent or effect has been clear from the beginning of our interpretive efforts ....").
" Whenever government supplies aid to religious schools, they relieve the school of an expense that the school would otherwise have had to pay for with its own, privately raised funds, even if the aid is neither potentially divertible nor actually diverted. Government aid, even if undivertible and undiverted, frees funds for worship, sectarian instruction, and other such activities that would otherwise be used to purchase the goods or services supplied by the government. E.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 461 (Douglas, J., concurring) ('The [religious] school is an organism living on one budget. What the taxpayers give for salaries of those who teach only the humanities or science without any trace of proselytizing enables the school to use all of its own funds for religious training."). The Court, however, never accepted this argument. See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230 (holding possibility that public services provided to private religious schools might enable such schools to cut spending in the same areas insufficient to violate the Establishment Clause); Bal4 473 U.S. at 394 (rejecting "the mere possibility of subsidization ... as sufficient to invalidate an aid program").
ion's worship and other sectarian activities-both classic attributes of the government-established church. Though this harm is largely symbolic, at least if the aid is supplied on a religiously neutral basis, it is nevertheless significant because of what such direct assistance implies: the unification of government with a particular religion, and the government's providing direct assistance to that religion's worship and sectarian activities, underwritten by taxes generally assessed on the entire population-all three of the classic attributes of the government-established church.
A majority of the Court has adhered to a comparable test, based on a comparable rationale, in some of the equal access cases." The Court has refused to endorse the proposition that religious speech in a public forum cannot constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause, reasoning that even if access to the forum is regulated by religion-neutral conditions, under some circumstances there could be a reasonable perception that the government endorses the religious speech occurring there and thereby has violated the Establishment Clause.95 A reasonable perception that the government, rather than a private individual or group, is sending a message of religious endorsement suggests one of the attributes of the government established church-the use of government power and authority to enforce the established church's rules and requirements.
" Pipette, 515 U.S. at 753; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395. 95 In Pipette, for example, the Court divided along nearly the same lines as it did in
Mitchell .See 515 U.S. at 757. The same four-Justice plurality maintained as a per se rule that private religious expression occurring in a public forum cannot be attributed to the government and thus cannot under any circumstances violate the Establishment Clause. Id at 770 (plurality opinion by Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., & Kennedy & Thomas, M.). Three Justices concurred in the judgment, but reserved the possibility that the government's operation of a public forum could conceivably create a reasonable perception that it endorsed religious speech occurring there. hi, at 777-78 (O'Connor, J., joined by Souter & Breyer,JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 785-86 (Souter, J., joined by O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The dissenters argued that the speech in question in fact created a perception of government endorsement notwithstanding its occurrence in a public forum. Id at 807-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841-42 (student Christian newspaper's receipt of university subsidy constituting limited public forum did not violate Establishment Clause because, inter alia, the university took "pains to disassociate itself" from the Christian newspaper, and any "mistaken impression that the student newspapers speak for the University" would not have been plausible);
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (church's use of school constituting limited public forum to show fihn series on Christian child-rearing did not violate Establishment Clause because, inter alio:, there was "no realistic danger that the community would think that the [school d] istrict was endorsing religion or any particular creed").
[ Vol. 43:1071 The use of actual or potential diversion in government aid cases and the perception of government endorsement in equal access cases reflect that separation is both historically and functionally at the core of the Establishment Clause. It was separation, not neutrality, that spoke to the abuses of the established church in the world of the founders." In the world of limited government inhabited by the framers, the mere separation of government and religious authority created religious liberty. Once government authority was severed from the established church, the church was unable to punish citizens for failure to conform to the church's denominational requirements, nor could it demand exclusive political and governmental privileges for members. Similarly, separation left the established church with no greater claim on general tax revenues than other churches and, indeed, most other private organizations. Finally, the severance of the established church from the government left the church free of the latter's control of its leaders, doctrines, and other internal matters.
Neutrality, on the other hand, is a belated concern brought on by the growth of positive rights in the American social welfare state. It is only when the government is a significant source of benefits and assistance for individuals and private groups that one must invoke neutrality to ensure that religious individuals and organizations are not financially or otherwise penalized simply because of their religious orientation.
Separation is closer to the core of the Establishment Clause in a functional as well as a historical sense. If one imagines alternate regimes respectively governed solely by separation and solely by neutrality, it seems clear that the latter holds more potential for the repression and persecution that characterized the classic establishment of religion. A purely separationist regime would handicap religions by denying them financial and other benefits of the social welfare state, but separation's prohibition on most church-state interactions would still leave considerable private, unregulated space for the practice of religion.97 A pure neutrality regime, however, would permit a substantial amount of government action that resembles the classic estab-" The historical claim that the founders understood the Establishment Clause to be primarily about neutrality between religious denominations has been decisively refuted by 209, 224 (1994) (arguing that the Sherbert-Yoder mandatory exemption doctrine abandoned by Smith was a manifestation of separationism).
lishtnent. For example, religious organizations could exercise government power and government could directly encourage and fund religious worship in a regime of neutrality so long as these were done on a religiously even-handed basis-that is, on the basis of secular criteria." As long as the distribution criteria were secular, it would apparently be of no constitutional significance that the overwhelming majority of the aid was directed to religious schools." For example, a local government might give religious groups-along with private schools, daycare centers, and other nonprofit businesses-the power unilaterally to prevent the operation in their vicinity of a business to which they have moral objections."° Public school prayer would be permissible, so long as religious and secular belief systems were given equal access to the prayer opportunity. 101 Sectarian religious instruction could be present in the schools, as one choice among many de-" See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 4, § 14-7, at 1188 (arguing that under a regime of strict neutrality, restrictions based on a recipient's religious character would be prohibited, and governmental programs that benefit religion, including direct subsidies, would be permitted so long as no religious classifications were employed in defining the recipients); Ira C. [Vol. 43:1071 nominational and ethical secular ones. 102 Tax dollars could even be used to build churches and to pay ministers and priests, so long as such funds were also available to build the meetinghouses and to pay the leaders of comparable secular organizations.m It should come as no surprise, then, that the Court's own decisions have repeatedly invoked prevention of the attributes of the classic establishment of religion as the "core" purpose of the Establishment Clause.'" Whereas the principle of neutrality protects against disadvantaging religion by denying it the rights and benefits of the social welfare state, the separation of church and state serves the more important purpose of protecting against the unification of coercive government power with religious authority, as well as the funding of denominational worship, ministry, and teaching with general tax revenues. It also protects against governmental control of the leadership, doctrine, and other internal matters of religious organizations. 105 The dramatic expansion of government during the twentieth century meant that for the government to satisfy equality concerns, religious individuals and organizations had to receive the same benefits as those received by comparably situated secular individuals and organizations. It is in this sense that one might speak of the contemporary welfare state's having created a "presumption of neutral- 
III. THREE DOCTRINAL OBSERVATIONS
The basic insight provided by the two-track theory of the Establishinent Clause is that separation, not neutrality, is the more fundamental Establishment Clause value. Just as the government's interest in maintaining majoritarian social order must ultimately yield to the free flow of information and ideas, so also separation defines the limit of neutrality analysis. The two-track theory of separation and neutrality supplies analytic focus and clarity to several current Establishment Clause controversies.
A. Tuition Vouchers for Education at Private Schools
With respect to religious school tuition vouchers, the two-track theory suggests that, in general, voucher programs do not violate the Establishment Clause. Zelman v, Simons-Harris merely confirmed what was already clear from the Court's previous decisions: The Establishment Clause permits government monetary aid to flow to religious schools if the schools qualify for aid under secular criteria and the determination whether any particular school receives aid is made by an individual parent or student rather than the governinent. w7 Indi- [Vol. 43:1071 vidual choice plays an indispensable role in upholding the facial validity of voucher programs under the Establishment Clause. Unlike inkind aid that is allocated directly to a religious school by government, voucher funds are fully fungible with the school's privately raised funds. Voucher support for even an unambiguously secular activity of a religious school frees the school's private funds that otherwise would have been devoted to the secular activity, and thus constitutes support for every other activity of the school, including undeniably sectarian activities." Application of a diversion test to voucher programs would require participating religious schools to segregate voucher funds or otherwise to track the goods and services on which they expend such funds, to demonstrate that the funds had actually been spent on secular activities and had not been diverted to sectarian uses." Voucher programs generally do not provide for the segregation or tracking of voucher fundsm and the Court has never required it'll As the Court recently explained in Zelman, "DA] here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choices," any advancement or endorsement of the schools' religious mission "is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits."n2 Any advancement or endorsement of religion, in other words, is "caused" by the individual recipient, and not by the government, so that the Establishment Clause is not violated. 113
Given the pervasive government funding of education, allowing religious schools to accept voucher funds bears no greater resemtransportation expenses incurred in sending child to public or qualified private elementary or secondary school).
blance on its face to a classic religious establishment than does the provision of police or fire protection to such schools." 4 Nevertheless, there may be circumstances in which separation analysis would properly apply to invalidate voucher programs. 115 First, separation analysis should apply when voucher funds are directed to religious schools that discriminate in favor of members of their sponsoring denomination, or that otherwise discriminate on the basis of religion. If most private school participants in voucher programs are religiously sponsored, as appears to be the case, and if private schools provide a significantly better education, as some voucher proponents dab -11, 116 then admissions discrimination by religious schools in favor of the congregants or members of the sponsoring religion will resemble the reservation of educational privileges that characterized the classic religious establishment.'" Separation analysis thus demands, at a minimum, that voucher participants employ nondiscriminatory admissions policies.
Second, if most private school participants in voucher programs are religious, and if educational gains by such participants are in fact achieved at the expense of public schools, as some voucher opponents predict,"8 then parents in areas subject to voucher programs may find 114 See Gedicks, Establishment Clause Neutrality, supra note 67, at 200 ("Mt is clearly permissible to allow government aid to flow directly to religious schools, so long as the schools qualify for the aid under secular criteria, and the amount of the aid is determined by student or parental choice and not by a government decision maker.").
114 For an insightful theoretical model analyzing challenges to voucher programs un-that they are forced as a practical matter to place their children in private religious schools to obtain an adequate education, irrespective of preference.ng This bears a strong resemblance to the classic religious establishment's reliance on government financial assistance to force participation in its services and activities. Thus, even a voucher program that requires a nondiscriminatory admissions policy on the part of religious participants may still be found invalid under the Establishment Clause if the program does not provide adequate secular schools as an alternative.1°F inally, neutrality analysis would permit the situation in which all of the activities of a participating religious school, including religious instruction and worship, are fully funded by voucher monies. Although the secular component of the education offered by a religious school may be quite high in comparison to the religious component, 121 it necessarily constitutes less, perhaps substantially less, than the entire educational experience, combining secular and religious components, offered by the school. If government funding exceeds the secular value of the education provided by a religious school, then it may reasonably be argued that this excess is funding the school's 119 Blasi, supra note 110, at 810 (suggesting that the Establishment Clause might be violated if a voucher system resulted in so many students in a school district choosing a particular religious school that it became the only local educational institution, public or private, able to provide a decent education," or "if the pattern of choices resulted in a variety of religious schools but no viable secular schools, public or private"); Lupu Be Tuttle, supra note 98, at 55 ('The combination of legal compulsion to educate their children, and the practical compulsion to avoid substandard schools, means that parents are not entirely free to accept or decline the offered exits from the neighborhood schools."); Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FottottAm L. Ray. 257, 267 (1999) 
B. Faith-based Provision by Government of Social Services
President Bush's promised expansion of faith based social service initiatives is bogged down in questions about the extent to which (if at all) religious social service providers should be exempt from federal antidiscrimination laws in hiring their employees. In one sense, an exemption permitting religious providers to discriminate in favor of their own members merely gives to such providers what secular nonprofits enjoy as a matter of course. Nonreligious providers are generally permitted to hire only those employees who share their ideological premises. For example, it violates no law for a secular provider to refuse to hire an applicant who is categorically opposed to providing welfare services to the poor. A secular provider who believes that the poor are exploited by capitalists in a worldwide class conflict may discriminate in favor of Marxists, just as a secular provider who believes that the poor are responsible for their own situations may discriminate in favor of economic conservatives who believe that wealth is ac-122 See Blasi, supra note 110, at 786 (" [O] pponents observe that the scale of the [voucher] subsidy means that tax revenues supplant rather than supplement the traditional, voluntary sources of funding for religious education, a feature that distinguishes vouchers from the much smaller, more specialized and restricted subsidies that occasionally have been upheld."); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 61, at 288-90 (observing that in some religious school aid cases the Court has emphasized the relative insignificance of government funding as a percentage of a religious school's overall budget); Underkuffler, supra note 113, at 181,187 (same).
123 See Blasi, supra note 110, at 786 ("As opponents view the matter, what is distinctive about vouchers is that coercively generated tax revenues pay for unambiguously religious instruction."); cf. Underkuffler, supra note 113, at 187 (arguing that "complete funding" of religious schools or other religious institutions "would clearly violate the prerogatives of conscience of individual taxpayers and encourage integration of governmental and religious institutional power").
[Vol. 43:1071 cumulated only by hard work. Exempting religious providers from antidiscrimination laws permits such providers to hire only those who share the religious beliefs that motivate and inform such providers' decisions to provide welfare services. Such an exemption would give to religious providers the same ideological discretion in hiring that nonreligious providers already have. 124
On the other hand, antidiscrimination exemptions implicate separation analysis in two opposing ways. Application of external social norms to religious providers' hiring decisions resembles government control over the leadership of the government-established church, particularly if the position being filled requires significant managerial or leadership responsibilities. Yet, the reservation of positions for congregants of the church sponsoring the religious provider clearly resembles the reservation of government and political privileges for communicants that characterized the classic Anglican establishment, particularly if the positions do not entail significant managerial or leadership responsibilities. Separation analysis thus points to a narrow antidiscrimination exemption, reaching only those who, at one extreme, like parish priests or employment counselors, exercise leadership or doctrinal authority in the sponsoring church, and not applying to those, at the other extreme, like receptionists, custodians, or mail clerks, whose jobs would require only a general (and not necessarily religious) commitment to government provision of social services.
C. Public School Prayer
The turn to neutrality in the 1980s and 1990s invigorated proponents of organized group prayer in public schools. The tactics currently employed by such proponents-a requirement of "nondenominational" prayers, a statement that the prayer merely "solemnizes" a school event, the delegation to voting student majorities of the decision whether to pray, and allowing such majorities to pick the person delivering the prayer from among a pool that includes potentially the entire student body-are all attempts to evade the strictures of church-state separation by fitting public school prayer under the umbrella of neutrality. This recourse to neutrality, however, obscures several fundamental issues of school-sponsored prayer, all of which entail separationist analysis. First, if school policy dictates a prayer, and the prayer that is actually delivered retains any theological content, the school is implicated in and responsible for that content, which necessarily violates the Establishment Clause.I 26 It is obvious that in a radically pluralistic society like the United States, even the most "nondenominational" religious observances are bound to offend some believers, and in some contexts may even coerce them. 127
Second, the use of government to sponsor and to encourage participation in worship and other religious rituals is an attribute of the established church. Indeed, the very attempt to dictate the content of that worship, as many public school prayer policies do, resembles one of the most repressive aspects of the established church. Finally, delegation to religious majorities of government decision making about creation and access to the prayer opportunity constitutes the unconstitutional delegation of governmental power to religion, yet another attribute of the established church.'"
The only way that group prayer can occur in public schools is when it is initiated by an individual student in a genuinely open forum-that is, a forum open to indiscriminate use by a wide variety of (though almost invariably theistic) religious rituals, symbols, and precepts to solemnize civic endeavors"); cf. Jay Alan Sekulow et at., Proposed Guidelines for Student Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1017, 1023 (1995) (arguing for the constitutionality of student-initiated prayer and proselytizing in public schools on the basis of content-neutrality and other Speech Clause doctrines).
128 E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306-10 (2000) (finding that because selection process for pre-game speaker invited and encouraged religious messages, those present at the game reasonably perceived the religious message as "a public expression of the views of the majority of the student body delivered with the approval of the school administration" in violation of the Establishment Clause); see Gedicks, Establishment Clause Neutrality, supra note 67, at 203 (arguing that speaker-identity and subjectmatter restrictions that exclude most nonreligious speakers and messages create the reasonable perception that those who deliver a religious message satisfying such restrictions are speaking on behalf of the government).
iv E.g., Newdow v. United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 2002 ) (two-toone decision) ("Although defendants argue that the religious content of 'one nation under God' [in the Pledge of Allegiance] is minimal, to an atheist or a believer in certain non Judeo-Christian religions or philosophies, it may reasonably appear to be an attempt to enforce a 'religious orthodoxy' of monotheism, and is therefore impermissible."); see Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 60, at 327 (discussing Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ). 128 Cf. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 305 (noting that student elections for the purpose of choosing whether a prayer shall occur and who shall deliver it impermissibly place minority views about such prayers at the mercy of majority views). student speakers other than those who wish to pray.' Few school administrators are willing to risk such lack of control. As a consequence, separation analysis will generally preclude organized group prayer in public schools.
CONCLUSION
An Establishment Clause based solely on neutrality presupposes that the core anti-establishment concerns of the Clause are no longer relevant. Although the possibility of full-scale restoration of the classic religious establishment in the United States is remote,'" there is nevertheless a credible threat that theological tolerance might replace theological skepticism as the conceptual model of the Establishment Clause. There is a disturbing insistence on the part of some that the United States is a "Christian nation" whose laws and government must reflect that "fact."131 Although the nation as a whole is religiously plural, perhaps even radically so, such pluralism does not obtain in every part of the country. For example, Mormons control Utah and exert considerable influence in the rest of the western Rockies; fundamentalist and other conservative Christians dominate the rural South and Midwest; and Roman Catholics and even Jews wield considerable political and cultural power in California, the Northeast, and many ur-129 See Gedicks, Establishment Clause Neutrality, supra note 67, at 203 (*The Court has consistently invalidated government-sponsored prayer whenever the government seeks to dictate or encourage the selection of a (particular) religious speaker or a (particular) religious message-that is, whenever the government is not willing to open up the opportunity for prayer into a true public forum permitting 'indiscriminate use' by secular as well as religious speakers for secular as well as religious messages."). Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("At this point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights.").
" See
See, e.g., James Dobson, Family News from Dr: James Dobson, Focus on the Family Newsletter, June 1996, at 3-4 (endorsing both the position that it is the "duty" of Americans "to select and prefer Christians" as their political leaders, and the declaration that the United States "is a Christian nation"); see also GILLES KEPEL, THE REVENGE OF GOD: THE RESUR-GENCE OF ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, AND JUDAISM IN THE MODERN WORLD 110, 123 (Alan Braley trans., 1994) (observing that since the mid-1970s, Protestant fundamentalists have endorsed "a political transformation of American by means of re-Christianization," with the goal of "'the principles of the Bible'" becoming "'the law of the land'" (quoting GARY NORTH, CHRISTIAN RECONSTRUCTION) ); GEORGE M. MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FUNDA-MENTALISM AND EVANGELICALISM 95, 110 (1991) (noting the birth of a powerful fundamentalist Protestant coalition in the 1970s opposed to abortion rights, pornography, and the Equal Rights Amendment; supporting school prayer; and stressing theological orthodoxy, rejection of secular morality, and "incivility toward persons with other beliefs" in addition to traditional evangelizing). ban areas. Thus, even if there is no credible national threat of the imposition of a tolerance model of the Establishment Clause, there is danger of such imposition in many states and localities. Separation and the two-track Establishment Clause speak to that danger. Like the two-track Speech Clause, which allows substantial regulation of lowvalue speech while preserving maximum constitutional protection for the political speech that is at the core of that Clause, the two-track Establishment Clause allows religious individuals and organizations to enjoy the rights and benefits of the social welfare state, while still safeguarding the anti-establishment concerns at the core of the Establishment Clause.
